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Abstract 
Waiting times are a major policy concern in publicly-funded health systems across OECD 
countries. Economists have argued that, in the presence of excess demand, waiting times act 
as non-monetary prices to bring demand for and supply of health care in equilibrium. Using 
administrative data disaggregated by region and surgical procedure over 2010-2014 in Italy, 
we estimate demand and supply elasticities with respect to waiting times. We employ linear 
regression models with first-differences and instrumental variables to deal with endogeneity 
of waiting times. We find that demand is inelastic to waiting times while supply is more 
elastic. Estimates of demand elasticity are between -0.15 to -0.24. Our results have 
implications on the effectiveness of policies aimed at increasing supply and their ability to 
reduce waiting times.  
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1. Introduction 
Waiting times in health care sector are a major health policy concern across many OECD 
countries (Siciliani, Borowitz and Moran, 2013). Waiting times for elective surgeries can last 
several months (Siciliani, Moran and Borowitz, 2014) and generate dissatisfaction to patients 
and the general puEOLF3DWLHQWV¶GLVXWLOLW\ IURPZDLWLQJ LQFOXGHVSRVWSRQHGKHDOWKEHQHILWV
potential worsening of health status while waiting, and uncertainty about receipt of treatment. 
In many publicly funded systems, the combination of capacity constraints and limited or no 
user charges generates an excess demand. Patients are added to a waiting list and are asked to 
wait. Economists have argued that in the absence of price rationing, waiting times act as a 
form of non-price rationing which brings together the demand for and the supply of health 
care (see seminal papers by Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984, and Martin and Smith, 1999). 
On the demand side, a longer wait will induce some patients to go private at a fee (or a 
reduced fee if they hold private health insurance) or to seek a less intensive drug treatment, 
therefore reducing the demand for public surgery. On the supply side, waiting times may 
induce hospitals to work harder and provide more treatments if doctors are altruistic (i.e. they 
feel bad about the patients waiting excessively) or if penalties are in place for hospitals 
exceeding maximum waiting time guarantees (see Martin and Smith, 1999, for a theoretical 
model, and Propper et al, 2008, on penalties).  
From a policy perspective, it is critical to establish the extent to which demand and supply 
respond to waiting time. For example, if demand is highly elastic, an exogenous increase in 
supply will only have minimal effect in reducing waiting times. In turn, this will make 
policymakers more reluctant to fund additional resources. Similarly, if supply is elastic, an 
exogenous increase in demand (e.g. due to ageing population or technology) will imply that 
waiting time will increase only to a small extent.  
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There is extensive empirical evidence on demand and supply elasticities from the United 
Kingdom. Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) and Martin and Smith (1999) find that the 
elasticity of demand is generally low. The finding is also confirmed by more recent studies 
(Gravelle, Dusheiko and Sutton, 2002; Gravelle, Smith and Xavier, 2003, and Martin, Jacobs, 
Rice and Smith, 2007). In most studies, demand elasticity is below -0.2. Estimates of supply 
elasticity are less stable and vary depending on methods, sample and time period considered 
(see Siciliani and Iversen, 2012 for a more detailed discussion of the literature). 
We know however very little about demand and supply elasticities from other OECD 
countries. These are likely to differ based on differ institutional arrangements (gatekeeping 
system, use of user charges, payment arrangements) and funding levels. Administrative data 
on waiting times have been collected within the English NHS since its inception, but only in 
the last years in other countries (Siciliani, Moran and Borowitz, 2014).  
We advance the literature by filling this gap in knowledge, and study demand and supply 
elasticities within the Italian context. Using administrative data in 2010-2014, we employ 
linear regression models exploiting variability in waiting times by region, surgical procedure 
and time. We first estimated pooled cross-section models using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Second, we use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to deal with the endogeneity of 
waiting time due to simultaneity of demand and supply. Finally, we use a first-difference 
estimation procedure to address the remaining endogeneity of waiting time due to its possible 
correlation with time-invariant unobserved factors. Differently from fixed-effect modes, 
which require strict exogeneity (i.e. the error term is uncorrelated to past, present as well as 
future values of the control variables), first-difference models only require a weak-exogeneity 
assumption (i.e. there is no feedback from the idiosyncratic shock today to a covariate 
tomorrow). This is a considerably weaker assumption as it permits future values of the 
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regressors to be correlated with the error, which is particularly important for the use of past 
values of regressors as controls or as instruments. 
Our key finding is that demand is inelastic to waiting times and in the range of -0.15 and -
0.24. This result is important for policy. It implies that an increase in publicly-funded supply 
will reduce waiting times to a great extent since reductions in waiting are only offset by a 
small increase in demand. Conversely, governments under financial pressure who withdraw 
resources from the public system will experience large increases in waiting times.  
As far as the authors are aware, this is the first study which uses administrative data to 
estimate demand and supply elasticities within the Italian context. We are only aware of 
another study which estimates demand elasticity for Italy (Fabbri and Monfardini, 2009). 
This study focuses on specialist consultations as opposed to elective surgeries. It makes use 
of survey in 2000 rather than recent administrative data. The methodology and period 
covered is different. We are also not aware of studies estimating demand and supply 
elasticities from other OECD countries (in addition to the UK) except for one study from 
Australia, which finds that demand of public hospitals is elastic to waiting times and equal to 
-1.7 (Stavrunova and Yerokhin, 2011). This may be explained by the large private sector 
which generates a more extensive margin between public and private provision compared to 
England. It also confirms that demand estimates can vary significantly across countries.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set out the theoretical framework for the 
estimation of demand for and supply of elective surgeries in the Italian NHS. In Section 3 we 
briefly describe the institutional background and sources of data. Sections 4 and 5 describe 
empirical implementation and provide descriptive statistics. Section 6 contains empirical 
results. Section 7 concludes and discusses some policy implications.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
We adopt the theoretical framework outlined by Martin and Smith (1999, 2003). We assume 
that waiting times act as a non-monetary price, which brings the demand for and the supply 
of elective surgery in equilibrium in a National Health System. The demand for publicly-
funded elective surgery is described by the following function and we include (in 
parentheses) the expected direction of each of the effects: 
ܦ ൌ ݂ሺݓܽ݅ݐ݅݊݃ݐ݅݉݁ሺെሻǡ ݊݁݁݀ሺ൅ሻǡ ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕሺ൅ሻǡ ݌ݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܽݒ݈ܾ݈ܽ݅ܽ݅݅ݐݕሺെሻሻ              (1) 
Demand for publicly-funded surgery is assumed to decrease in waiting times. Longer waiting 
times may induce some patients at the margin to look for treatment in the private sector by 
paying out of pocket (or if they hold private health insurance) and therefore to opt out of the 
public system (i.e. the NHS). In addition, longer waits may induce some patients to substitute 
surgery with a pharmaceutical treatment therefore reducing demand for publicly-funded 
surgery.  
Demand for public treatment will be higher in areas with higher need, e.g. areas with an older 
and sicker population, and in areas where the quality of healthcare is higher making hospital 
services more attractive to patients (though quality is potentially endogenous if low demand 
reduces quality due to learning-by-doing effects). Similarly, private hospital availability is 
assumed to reduce demand for public treatment: smaller access costs to the private sector will 
induce some patients to switch from the public to the private sector (Martin and Smith, 2003; 
Martin et al., 2007). 
The supply of (publicly-funded) elective surgery is assumed to be determined by waiting time 
and local resources: 
ܵ ൌ ݃ሺݓܽ݅ݐ݅݊݃ݐ݅݉݁ሺ൅ሻǡ ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕሺ൅ሻሻ     (2) 
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We assume that long waits induce the provider to increase the supply, for given level of 
inputs, for both altruistic and non-altruistic motivations. Doctors may be willing to work 
harder when waiting times are longer since they care about the patients. Waiting times are 
regularly used as performance indicators or targets for public providers (and for private 
providers treating publicly-funded patients). When waiting times are longer hospitals with a 
higher proportion of patients waiting longer than expected may be under tighter scrutiny from 
the regulator (Linsday and Feigenbaum,1984; Propper et al., 2008; Siciliani and Iversen, 
2012). Longer waits may also reduce idle capacity due to random patient arrivals, and 
therefore increase efficiency and the number of patients treated, though this effect is likely to 
be modest when waiting times are generally long (Iversen, 1997; Siciliani, Stanciole and 
Jacobs, 2009). Finally, the supply of care in a region is a function of its inputs, such as the 
number of available beds in publicly-funded hospitals and their personnel, which determine 
the overall capacity.  
  
3. Institutional background and data 
The Italian healthcare system is publicly funded with hospitals reimbursed by DRG according 
to volumes performed. The system is decentralised: Italy is divided in 19 regions and two 
autonomous provinces (Trento and Bolzano). The Italian National Health Systems (NHS) 
was founded in 1978, provides full coverage to every citizen and is funded through national 
and regional taxation. In 2001 the Constitutional reform gave regions the freedom to choose 
the type of healthcare model, generating great variability in institutional arrangements across 
regions.  
Every region can decide its own organisational and regulatory scheme for public and private 
sector, how to allocate resources, define prevention and budgetary policies, strategic plans 
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(e.g. building new hospitals) and elective admission rules. To avoid excessive territorial 
disparities, the Italian Ministry of Health sets the Essential Levels of Assistance, which are 
minimum healthcare requirements that regions have to provide, whose compliance is 
annually verified by the national government. Heterogeneity in regional policies has emerged 
in relation to waiting times (Fattore et al., 2013) driven by differences in co-payment 
schemes, unified booking centres and promotion of private health insurance, providing a 
fragmented framework with regional disparities.  
There are similarities but also differences between the Italian and the English National Health 
Service. In England, to which most of the empirical literature refers to, hospitals are also paid 
by a DRG-type payment system (known as Healthcare Resources Groups, HRGs) and 
patients have choice of hospital. Patients are also heavily insured with no co-payments for 
surgery or specialist visits, and some co-payments for drugs. In both countries there are 
exemptions for persons with disabilities or chronic conditions, pregnant women, elderly, 
children (Paris et al., 2010). There are more pronounced differences between England and 
other health systems in the UK (e.g. Scotland and Wales) but arrangements vary less across 
different regions within England. In this respect, Italy has much more pronounced differences 
across regions in organisational arrangements and regulatory schemes.  
The proportion of private health expenditure is similar for both countries. The share of public 
health expenditure with regard to total expenditure at the beginning or our period of 
observation was about 76.5% for Italy and 81.7% for the UK. Although the public-private 
mix is similar on the funding side, this is not the case on the hospital provision one. 96% of 
acute care beds in the UK is provided by public hospitals, while this is only 81.5% in Italy 
where 16.7% of the total number of acute beds is provided by not-for-profit private hospitals 
(Paris et al., 2010). 
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In this paper we use information on waiting times provided by the Italian Ministry of 
+HDOWK¶V 6WDWLVWLFDO 2IILFH.1 Waiting times are available for 19 regions and the two 
autonomous provinces for several procedures during the period 2010-2014. Waiting times are 
calculated for elective publicly-funded patients who receive treatment in a public or private 
hospital. They are published annually in the Hospital Discharges Report (HDR) by the 
Ministry of Health. Waiting times are defined as the number of days elapsed between the 
time the patient has been added to a hospital waiting list for elective surgery and the day the 
patient is admitted to the hospital to receive the treatment. From the same source and for each 
year, region and procedure we collect data on hospital utilisation, i.e. the total number of 
elective and emergency discharges. Hospital utilisation rates are computed for each procedure 
as the ratio of the total number of discharges to the regional population in a given year. 
Hospital utilisation also refers to publicly-funded patients regardless of the type of provider 
(public or private) in which they receive treatment. The annual report for Hospital Discharges 
refers to patients treated in public hospitals and from the same source of data we calculate 
within each combination of region and year the overall share of patients treated in public 
hospitals paying with their own resources. The share is on average only about 2%, which is in 
line with findings as in Vittadini et al. (2012). 
We use data on waiting time for elective surgical (as opposed to medical) treatments since 
only these are available from administrative sources and are used as hospital targets. The ten 
procedures included in the HDR are: prostatectomy, breast cancer, colon cancer, uterus 
cancer and lung cancer surgeries, coronary bypass, percutaneous transluminal coronary 
                                                          
1
 Data are publicly available on the Italian Ministry of Health website (www.salute.gov.itXQGHU6HFWLRQ³7HPL
HSURIHVVLRQL´)LJXUHVVXEVHFWLRQV³$VVLVWHQ]DRVSHGDOHHWHUULWRULR´$VVLVWDQFHKRVSLWDOVDQGORFDODUHDV
³5LFRYHUL2VSHGDOLHUL´+RVSLWDOGLVFKDUJHVDQGLWLVSRVVLEOHWRVHOHFWDQGGRZQORDGDQQXDOUHSRUWVDQGGDWD 
www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1237&area=ricoveriOspedalieri&menu=vuoto   
We use the original data and no data cleaning was performed apart for the exclusions mentioned in this section.  
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angioplasty, carotid endarterectomy, hip replacement and tonsillectomy.2 We exclude 
tonsillectomy since regions show heterogeneous clinical attitudes and protocols which in turn 
reduce comparability across regions (Materia et al., 2005; see also national guidelines 
provided by the Italian Institute of Health for this clinical area3). We also compute the 
proportion of emergency discharges as the ratio between the number of emergency discharges 
and the total number of discharges by procedure, region and year. In summary, the HDR data 
used in this analysis vary along three dimensions: surgical procedure, region and year.  
Control variables are obtained from demographic indicators available from ISTAT (the 
Italian National Institute of Statistics), which vary only by year and region, not by procedure. 
They include number of residents, age distribution in the regional population and age and sex 
adjusted mortality rates. From the age distribution of residents, we calculate the proportion of 
population over 60 years old. We use risk-adjusted mortality rates and proportion of the 
elderly as a need indicators.  
As measure of local resources in the supply equation, we measure the capacity of private and 
public providers within each region. These are measured as (i) the total number of acute care 
beds in public and private hospitals (standardised by the number of residents); and (ii) the 
ratio between beds in private hospitals and total number of beds within each region. Private 
hospitals treat both publicly and privately-funded patients and our data do not allow to make 
a distinction whether the treatment is paid by the NHS or privately. Since regulatory policies 
vary across regions in relation to reimbursements to private providers, it is not possible to 
identify the number ± or the proportion ± of publicly-funded patients who are treated by the 
private sector. Therefore private hospitals contribute to the capacity available to publicly-
funded patients. Variable (ii) measures the public-private mix in provision in each region.  
                                                          
2
 Other six procedures have been added in 2011 but there are consistency issues across regions, which prevented 
their use here. 
3
 http://www.snlg-iss.it/pubblico_tonsillectomia_adenoidectomia  
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On the demand equation, we use control variables from the annual National Survey on 
+RXVHKROGHUV¶/LIHVW\OHVDQGFRPSXWHWKHSURSRUWLRQRIUHJLRQDOSRSXODWLRQVPRNLQJPRUH
than 11 cigarettes per day on the total number of smokers as a proxy of unhealthy behaviour. 
We use the C-section rate as a proxy of poor appropriateness of care, which is a form of 
quality. This is computed as the total number of C-section deliveries to the total number of 
births within each region, which is provided in the HDR by the Italian Ministry of Health. C-
section rates have been used by international organisations (OECD, 2015; WHO, 2015) as 
markers of appropriateness of care in health system performance. High C-section rates (on 
total births) are positively associated to complications and maternal and infant morbidity. 
According to the OECD, Italy has a surprisingly high C-section rate compared to other 
OECD countries although there are marked differences across regions, which we exploit in 
our analysis.  
To measure the availability of private supply to privately-funded patients, which could 
potentially reduce demand for public services, we measure the number of acute care beds in 
private hospitals (standardised by the number of residents)4. Ideally, we would have liked to 
measure the number of private hospital beds available to privately-funded patients, therefore 
excluding beds available to publicly-funded patients. Information on private beds is however 
available only at hospital level, and is not split between publicly- and privately-funded 
patients. 
We do not have information on the fraction of patients who die on the waiting list. However, 
the proportion of patients who are likely to die while on the waiting list is negligible for most 
of the elective procedures (e.g. hip replacement). Even for most of the more serious 
                                                          
4
 Beds refer to the number of beds available in each Region on the 1st of January of each year. We only 
considered beds for elective patients, thus excluding beds for day cases and day surgeries. Source: Ministero 
della Salute - 'LSDUWLPHQWR GHOOD SURJUDPPD]LRQH H GHOO¶RUGLQDPHQWR GHO 6HUYL]LR VDQLWDULR QD]LRQDOH - 
Direzione generale del sistema informativo e statistico sanitario; 
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conditions (e.g. cancer) elective patients experiencing a worsening of their health status are 
treated quickly or as emergencies.  
 
4. Econometric Specification 
We use linear models to estimate the impact of waiting times on the demand for and supply 
of surgical treatments. We estimate separate models for demand and supply. We assume that 
the system is in equilibrium and that demand ݕ௜௥௧ௗ  in equation (1) equates supply ݕ௜௥௧௦   in 
equation (2), so that ݕ௜௥௧ௗ ൌ ݕ௜௥௧௦ ൌ ݕ௜௥௧.  
The empirical specification of the demand equation is: 
ݕ௜௥௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ݓ௜௥௧ᇱ ߚ ൅ ݔ௜௥௧ᇱ ߛ ൅ ݖ௥௧ᇱ ߜ ൅ ݄௧ ൅ ݄௜ ൅ ߝ௜௥௧,      (3) 
where subscript ݅ indicates the type of elective surgery (e.g. hip replacement, surgeries for 
breast cancer etc., with, ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܫ), ݎ the region (with ݎ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ )ܴ , ݐ the year (with ݐ ൌ ? ? ? ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ? ? ? ?). Utilisation rate (ݕ௜௥௧) and waiting time (ݓ௜௥௧) are log-transformed so that the 
key coefficient of interest (ߚ) can be interpreted as the elasticity of demand with respect to 
waiting time. Utilisation rates are the total number of discharges for a given surgical 
procedure in a region and year standardised by population (the total number of residents, in 
thousands) of the region in the same year. 
The vector ݔ௜௥௧ includes control variables that vary over time, procedures and regions, such 
as the proportion of emergency discharges. The vector ݖ௥௧ includes variables which vary only 
over time and region and, in the demand equation, it includes the proportion of residents over 
60, smoking prevalence, age and sex adjusted mortality rates at time ݐ െ  ?, the number of 
private beds per capita and the C-section rate as indicator of poor quality.  
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The empirical model also includes time dummies݄௧ to capture common time trends and 
surgical procedure dummies ݄௜ to control for differences in waiting times by procedure which 
amongst other factors reflect different degree of urgencies (e.g. cancer patients waiting less 
than hip replacement patients). We therefore exploit variations of waiting times across 
regions pooled across several years, controlling for the type of procedure, to identify the 
effect of waiting on demand. ߝ௜௥௧ is the error term.  
The empirical specification of the supply of elective surgery (ݕ௜௥௧) is analogous to equation 
(3) but uses a different set of controls (ݔ௜௥௧ǡ ݖ௥௧). ݔ௜௥௧ includes the proportion of emergency 
discharges. ݖ௥௧ includes the per capita number of acute beds in public and private hospitals 
and the proportion of beds in private hospitals on the total amount of available beds within 
each region.  
Since average waiting times in Italy are relatively short (about one month), we model demand 
for elective care as contemporaneously responding to waiting time, given the yearly 
frequency of our data. We model the relation between supply and waiting time also as 
simultaneous since providers can quickly react to waiting time which they observe with no 
time lag, and are also aware that waiting time are annually assessed by the Ministry of 
Health. 
The ordinary least square estimation of equation (3), which again is estimated separately for 
the demand and supply equation, might produce a biased and inconsistent estimate of the 
coefficient of interest ߚ. As mentioned above, longer waiting times may reduce demand for 
public treatment (because some patients opt for swifter private treatment) and also increase 
the supply of public treatments (due to targets or altruistic motives): therefore, waiting times 
are endogenous and have a simultaneous effect on both demand for and supply of treatment. 
Following previous literature (e.g. Martin and Smith, 1999, 2003), we instrument waiting 
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time in the supply equation with a selection of exogenous demand shifters and we instrument 
waiting time in the demand equation with a selection of exogenous supply shifters. As the 
latter proved to be weak instruments, we also used the lag of waiting time as an instrument in 
demand models.5 
To eliminate the remaining time-invariant unobservable factors, e.g. at regional level, that 
might simultaneously affect the dependent variable as well as the controls in the regression, 
we also estimated first-difference models. This specification will for example control for any 
time-invariant regional factor (e.g. proportion of individuals holding private insurance, which 
is unlikely to vary quickly over time). We prefer the first-difference models over the (region) 
fixed-effect models, since the latter require the strong exogeneity assumption,6 which is 
violated when we use the lag of waiting time as an instrument. Although the first-difference 
models are less efficient of fixed-effects ones they only require weak exogeneity (i.e. that 
there is no feedback from the idiosyncratic shocks today to a covariate or an instrument 
tomorrow). The first difference version of the previous model is: 
 ȟݕ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൌ ߚଵ ڄ ȟݓ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ȟݔ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵᇱ ߛ ൅ ȟݖ௥௧ǡ௧ିଵᇱ ߜ ൅ ݄௧ െ ݄௧ିଵ ൅ ȟߝ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵ,       (4) 
We estimate an analogous model for the supply (i.e.ȟݕ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵ௦ ). 
To control for endogeneity caused in the demand model by the presence of waiting time, we 
instrument ȟݓ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵ with  ȟݓ௜௥௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ. This is a valid instrument since 
ܥ݋ݒ൫ȟߝ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵǡ ȟߝ௜௥௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ൯ ൌ ܥ݋ݒ൫ሺߝ௜௥௧ െ ߝ௜௥௧ିଵሻǡ ሺߝ௜௥௧ିଶ െ ߝ௜௥௧ିଷሻ൯ ൌ  ?Ǥ 
                                                          
5
 This instrument is used also in Martin and Smith (2003). Admittedly, this is not an ideal instrument because 
persistency of waiting time over the years can cause the error term in the base equation to remain correlated, to 
some extent, with the instrument. 
6
 The within transformation of error term (ߝ௜௧ െ ߝҧ௜) and of the log of waiting times (ݓ௜௧ െ ݓഥ௜) are correlated 
through their means. 
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To check the validity of the instruments we use the F-statistic on the excluded instruments, 
both for robust and cluster standard errors, under the null of weak instruments. Following 
Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), we conclude that instruments are valid if the F-statistic is 
larger than 10.  
 
5. Descriptive Statistics  
We use data from nineteen Italian regions and two autonomous provinces for five years and 
nine surgical procedures.  Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for variables entering the 
supply and demand equations, respectively. Due to the presence of lagged variables in 
estimation procedure we report descriptive statistics for four years of observation (732 units ± 
left hand side of Table 1) and for the last two (366 units ± right hand side of Table 1), which 
are respectively the maximum and minimum sample size used, depending on whether the 
lagged values of waiting time is used as instrument in the first-difference estimation.  
On average the per capita utilisation is of about 0.6 procedures per thousand residents, of 
which about 22% is emergency discharges. Waiting time is about 31 days across all 
procedures. The number of total beds for acute care per thousand residents is about 2.84 
whereas the availability of private beds per thousand residents is 0.48. The proportion of 
population over 60 years old is about 28% and the proportion of smokers who smoke more 
than 11 cigarettes per day is close to 40%. C-section rates are on average around 35% and 
adjusted mortality rate per thousand residents at time ݐ െ  ? is about 1%. The summary 
statistics are similar across the two samples used in the analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the average waiting time and utilisation rate for different procedures, at the 
beginning and at the end of the study period. It suggests that there is larger variability across 
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treatments than over time, with hip replacement procedures (Hip) having the longest wait.  
Lung and Uterus cancer surgeries, PTCA exhibit the shortest wait. Figure 2 shows that 
waiting times and utilisation rates exhibit high variability across regions both at the beginning 
and at the end of the period. 
 
6. Empirical results  
In Table 2 we report the results for the demand equation. We first estimated the model in 
equation (3) using ordinary least squares (OLS) over the period 2011-14. The model includes 
year- and procedure-fixed effects and is reported in the first column. In line with previous 
literature (e.g. Martin and Smith, 2003) we first considered a cross-sectional specification, 
exploiting variability across procedures, regions and years. Given the likely endogeneity of 
waiting times, we estimate the same model with instrumental variables (IV), using as 
instrument the lagged value of waiting times. The model is reported in the second column. 
Because of the inclusion of the one-year lagged value of waiting time among controls of the 
demand model, we lose the first year of observations. Hence, we omit the first year from all 
estimation samples to maintain data consistency. Estimation results for the cross-sectional 
analysis show a negative and significant at 10% level coefficient for waiting time. The OLS 
estimation suggests an elasticity of demand to waiting time of -0.1, which increases (in 
absolute value) to -0.15 once waiting time is instrumented. In the third and fourth column of 
Table 2, we estimate the same models but restrict the sample to the last two years, to compare 
the results with those obtained in the first-difference (FD) specification (see model (4) 
above). In this restricted, hence less informative sample, the elasticity of waiting time 
coefficient loses statistical significance, but the magnitude of the coefficient remains similar. 
In the last two columns of Table 2, which uses FD estimation, we test whether the results for 
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the demand equation are robust once controlling for time-invariant characteristics in the error 
term, which might be an additional source of endogeneity. The results show that the elasticity 
is equal to -0.04 using OLS and increases (in absolute value) to -0.24 with an IV estimation, 
which uses the 2-years-lagged difference in waiting times as an instrument, albeit statistical 
evidence is weak.  
In relation to the control variables, we find that lower hospital quality (i.e. higher C-section 
rates) reduces demand. A higher proportion of emergency discharges and of heavy smokers 
(unhealthy lifestyle), both reduce the demand. Since the FD models control for time-invariant 
characteristics, the statistical significance of some control variables reduces. This is not the 
case for the emergency admission rate, which remains highly statistically significant.  
The F-statistics for the instrument used in the first stage regression show that the instrument 
is valid, even when FD models are used. In Appendix 1, Table A1 we report first-stage 
regressions, which show positive associations of waiting time over years, and of waiting time 
with population over 60, whereas the associations between waiting time and share of 
emergency discharges and C-section rate tend to be negative. In the first-difference model 
(Appendix 1, Table A1, third column) we find a negative coefficient of lagged waiting times, 
which is negative by construction as the autocorrelation coefficient for the change of waiting 
time is positive.7 
Table 3 contains results for the supply equation. Again, it presents first the OLS and then the 
IV estimation for each model. In the first two columns we present the pooled cross-sectional 
                                                          
7
 This follows from computing the correlation coefficient of ൫ȟݓ௜௥௧ǡ௧ିଵǡ ȟݓ௜௥௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ൯, which has opposite sign 
with respect to the correlation coefficient of ൫ݓ௜௥௧ǡǡ ݓ௜௥௧ିଵ൯. Intuitively, assuming for simplicity a simple 
autoregressive model for our first stage regression, the sign of the autocorrelation coefficient, ߩ൫ȟݓ௧ǡ௧ିଵǡ ȟݓ௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ൯ is given by the sign of its numerator, i.e. the covariance ܥ൫ȟݓ௧ǡ௧ିଵǡ ȟݓ௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ൯Ǥ The latter 
can be written as ܥ൫ȟݓ௧ǡ௧ିଵǡ ȟݓ௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ൯ ൌ ܥሺݓ௧ ǡ ݓ௧ିଶሻ െ ܥሺݓ௧ ǡ ݓ௧ିଷሻ െ ܥሺݓ௧ିଵǤ ݓ௧ିଶሻ ൅ ܥሺݓ௧ିଵǤ ݓ௧ିଷሻ, and 
under weak stationarity (i.e. ܥሺݓ௧ ǡ ݓ௧ି௛ሻ ൌ ߛ, for all integer values of ݐ,h), ܥ൫ȟݓ௧ǡ௧ିଵǡ ȟݓ௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ൯ ൌെߛሺߛ െ  ?ሻଶ, which implies that for a positive autocorrelation coefficient it must be that ߛ ൐  ? and the sign of ߩ൫ȟݓ௧ǡ௧ିଵǡ ȟݓ௧ିଶǡ௧ିଷ൯ is negative. 
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specification over the period 2011-14. Estimates show an elastic supply of elective surgery to 
waiting time only when waiting time is instrument. Here, we use as instrument the proportion 
of population over 60 years old, which is a key driver of demand and exogenous to supply. 
The following two columns show that results are qualitatively similar when only observations 
in 2013-14 are used. In all cross-sectional models the number of beds in public and private 
hospitals, measuring local endowments, has a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting 
that the higher capacity increases supply. A higher rate of emergency discharges reduces the 
supply for elective interventions, since emergency discharges require more stand-by capacity. 
The results are robust to the use of alternative instruments, including C-section rates. All 
instruments are valid in the cross-sectional models and first-stage results are presented in 
Appendix 1, Table A2.  
In the last four columns of Table 3 we report estimation results for first-difference estimates, 
which controls for time-invariant characteristics. The waiting time coefficients are still 
positive but smaller and not statistically significant. Given the aggregate nature of our data, 
the lack of statistical significance might be due to the loss of information caused by the first 
difference transformation. Moreover, all instruments used are weak and vary only by region 
and year.  
Other factors should ideally be included in the demand equation, such as (average) distance 
to the hospital or co-payments, which are likely to deter some patients and reduce demand. A 
variable capturing the average distance would require detailed access to patient level data and 
geographical coordinates between SDWLHQWV¶UHVLGHQFHDQGKRVSLWDODGGUHVV. We conjecture the 
bias caused by the omission of these variables is likely to be negligible in our first-difference 
model which controls for time-invariant factors including regional (fixed) effects. The 
average distance to hospital is unlikely to have changed significantly over time. 
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We check the robustness of our findings on the demand side excluding the variable that is 
related to smoking prevalence. Coefficients and significance levels are similar to the one 
presented in base model at the cost of losing estimate precision in the waiting time coefficient 
for the pooled IV cross-section (see Appendix 1, Table A3).  
As a robustness check of the supply equation estimation, we also measure the per capita cost 
of medical staff (wages) in public hospitals as an additional input in the production function 
of publicly-funded treatments. The results are very similar in terms of magnitude and 
significance of coefficients (see Appendix 1, Table A4), though the power of the instruments 
is marginally reduced possibly due to the high correlation between wages and beds (equal to 
0.9). 
The small sample size does not allow us to perform sensitivity analysis by intervention type.  
Nonetheless we test the robustness of our results by excluding from the sample procedures 
with more than 40% of emergency discharges (i.e. percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty whose fraction of emergency discharges is 67%), and we found similar pointwise 
estimates, though with some precision loss (results omitted but available from the authors).  
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
We have used administrative data on waiting times and volume of elective surgeries across 
different procedures and regions in Italy over the period 2010-2014. Our key finding suggests 
that the demand for elective surgery is inelastic to waiting times, and the elasticity is in the 
range of -0.15 and -0.24. This is in line with the literature on England (Martin and Smith, 
1999, 2003; Martin et al. 2007), which provides a comparable demand elasticity of -0.2. The 
statistical significance of our results is however weaker and this is likely to be due to our use 
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of aggregated data at regional level as opposed to electoral ward and a shorter time series 
used in the English context (Martin and Smith, 2003, 2007).  
The similar elasticity between Italy and the UK could be the result of the similarities between 
health systems (both with a National Health Service, similar public-private funding mix, and 
financial arrangements for hospitals). But there are also differences (such as the differences in 
public-private mix in hospital provision) and a priori they could be different. The importance 
of different institutional arrangements across health systems is indeed confirmed by the 
different demand elasticity for Australia, which has been estimated at -1.7 (Stavrunova and 
Yerokhin, 2011). But in Australia, the public-private mix is very different on the funding 
side, with more than half of the population holding private health insurance and therefore 
more susceptible to switch from the public to the private sector when waiting times are 
longer.  
Although our study suggests a weak effect of waiting times on demand, the results have 
important policy implications in relation to the effectiveness policy initiatives that encourage 
an expansion in supply (through more funding, an extension of working hours, revision of 
contracts, contracting out to existing private providers etc.) to reduce waiting times. Some 
policymakers have argued that such supply-side policy initiatives can be ineffective since an 
increase in supply can be offset by large increases in demand (Hurst and Siciliani, 2005). 
Whether there are merits to this argument depends critically on the demand elasticity to 
waiting times. Our results show that within the Italian institutional context the demand is 
inelastic. Therefore, policies aimed at increasing supply would be effective in reducing 
waiting times.  
At times of great financial pressure following the economic crisis, governments have 
introduced or are introducing measures to keep health expenditure under control, which is 
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likely to imply a reduction or a slower growth in supply. Driven by the ageing population and 
technology, the gap between demand and supply may increase and, based on our findings, so 
will waiting times and waiting lists. Governments therefore need to consider policy 
interventions which act on the demand, for example by reducing unnecessary referrals 
through better coordination between GPs and specialists (Mariotti et al., 2014) or improving 
the prioritisation of the list to minimise the impact of delays (Siciliani, Borowitz and Moran, 
2013). 
Health systems differ to a great extent across the OECD countries on funding, provision and 
organisational arrangements. As data on waiting times become increasingly available, future 
work could replicate our analysis in other health systems to inform the policy debate on 
supply-side initiatives aimed at reducing waiting times.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Estimation period: 
 2011-2014 
 Estimation period: 
 2013-2014 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Utilisation rate (per 1000 
residents) 
732 0.60 0.65  366 0.61 0.67 
Waiting time (days) 732 31.33 0.55  366 30.87 0.53 
 
       
Demand shifters        
Emergency discharges (%) 732 21.64 22.44  366 22.86 22.95 
C-section rates (%) 732 35.09 9.45  366 34.77 9.24 
Heavy smokers (%) 732 39.59 4.59  366 38.46 4.62 
Population over 60 years old 
(%) 
732 27.75 2.66  366 28.00 2.60 
Private beds (per 1000 
residents) 
732 0.48 0.28  366 0.46 0.27 
Mortality rate (per 1000 
residents, at ݐ െ  ?) 732 10.29 1.26  366 10.21 1.23 
 
       
Supply shifters        
Emergency discharges (%) 732 21.64 22.44  366 22.86 22.95 
Beds (public and private, per 
1000 residents) 
732 2.84 0.29  366 2.73 0.28 
Private beds (%) 732 0.17 0.10  366 0.17 0.10 
Source: Our calculations using ISTAT and HDR data.  
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Table 2: Demand estimates 
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference 
 
Estimation period:  
2011 ± 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 ± 14 
 Estimation period:  
2013 ± 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV 
          
 
    
Waiting time (log) -0.102* -0.149* -0.045 -0.128  -0.04* -0.238* 
 
(0.060) (0.086) (0.067) (0.105)  (0.023) (0.142) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.016***  -0.002** -0.004** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.001) 
C-section rates (%) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.016***  -0.006 -0.016 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.051) 
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.018 0.021 -0.004 0.003  0.004 -0.012 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.039) (0.041)  (0.045) (0.057) 
Proportion of heavy smokers (%) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.015***  0.000 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Private beds (per 1000 residents) 0.047 0.050 0.041 0.047  0.054 0.05 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035)  (0.056) (0.061) 
Mortality rate (per 1000  0.029 0.024 0.057 0.049  -0.01 -0.028 
residents, at ݐ െ  ?) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069)  (0.019) (0.024) 
Constant 6.078*** 6.175*** 6.002*** 6.147***  -0.009 -0.002 
 
(0.509) (0.513) (0.576) (0.561)  (0.013) (0.0159) 
     
 
  Observations 732 732 366 366  366 366 
R-squared 0.902 
 
0.9 
 
 0.025 
 First stage F-stat   196.7   116.3    11.15 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-sectional 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument used in pooled cross-
section models is the 1-year-lagged waiting time; in the first difference specification it includes 2-years-lagged values of first differences. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered 
25 
 
Table 3: Supply estimates 
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference First-difference 
 
Estimation period:  
2011 ± 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 ± 14 
 Estimation period:  
2011 ± 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 ± 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
      
   
        
Waiting time (log) 0.010 1.069*** 0.079 0.718***  0.025 0.627* -0.036 0.176 
 
(0.057) (0.354) (0.057) (0.237)  (0.045) (0.360) (0.022) (0.206) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.010*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.016**  0.001 0.003 -0.002** -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Beds (public and private, per 1000 residents) 1.567*** 1.313*** 1.408*** 1.124***  0.018 0.382 -0.085 0.009 
 
(0.314) (0.416) (0.352) (0.386)  (0.220) (0.373) (0.193) (0.233) 
Private beds  (%) -0.399* -0.203 -0.116 0.092  0.100 -0.379 0.367 0.591 
 
(0.237) (0.362) (0.213) (0.287)  (0.696) (1.130) (0.461) (0.556) 
Constant -7.041*** -8.416** -5.902** -5.732*  0.006 0.002 -0.013 -0.011 
 
(2.537) (3.323) (2.811) (2.981)  (0.025) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
   
  
 
    Observations 732 732 366 366  732 732 366 366 
R-squared 0.887 
 
0.896   0.001  0.021  
First stage F-stat   14.04   18.90    4.439   2.622 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-section 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument set in pooled cross-section 
models includes proportion of population over 60 years old; in the first-difference specifications it also includes C-section rates. Robust and clustered 
standard errors computed. 
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Figure 1: Utilisation rate and waiting time across procedures in 2010 and 2014.  
 
Source: Our calculations over HDR data. Notes: procedures considered are breast cancer (Breast), prostatectomy (Prostate), colon cancer (Colon), uterus cancer (Uterus) and 
lung cancer (Lung) surgeries, coronary bypass (Bypass), percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), carotid endarterectomy (Carotid), hip replacement (Hip) 
and tonsillectomy (Ton).  
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Figure 2: Utilisation rate and waiting time across regions in 2010 and 2014. 
 
Source: Our calculations over HDR data. Notes: Regions considered are Abruzzo (Abr), Basilicata (Bas), Autonomous Province of Bolzano (Bol), Campania (Cam), Calabria 
(Cal), Emilia-Romagna (Emi), Friuli Venezia Giulia (Fri), Lazio (Laz), Lombardia (Lom), Liguria (Lig), Marche (Mar), Molise (Mol), Piemonte (Pie), Puglia (Pug), 
Sardegna (Sar), Sicilia (Sic), Toscana (Tos), Autonomous Province of Trento (Tre), Umbria (Umb), Veneto (Ven).  
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Appendix 1: Additional results. 
Table A1. First Stage Estimates, Demand Equation. 
  
Pooled  
cross-section 
Pooled  
cross-section 
First- 
difference 
Variables 2011 ± 14 2013 ± 14 2013 ± 14 
        
Waiting time (log) at t-1 0.653*** 0.610***  
 
(0.047) (0.057)  
Waiting time (log) at t-2    -0.181*** 
   (0.054) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.005*** 0.002 -0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
C-section rate (%) 0.001 -0.005** -0.025* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
Proportion of heavy smokers (%) -0.000 0.004 0.008** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.040*** 0.052*** -0.075 
 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.103) 
Private beds (per 1000 residents) 0.012 0.039** -0.042 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.129) 
Mortality rate (per 1000 residents, at ݐ െ  ?) -0.047* -0.063** -0.076* 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.044) 
Constant 0.447* 0.228 0.036 
 
(0.250) (0.329) (0.030) 
    Observations 732 366 366 
R-squared 0.798 0.824 0.109 
The dependent variable is waiting time and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all specifications 
we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. Robust and clustered standard errors computed. 
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Table A2. First Stage Estimates, Supply Equation. 
  
Pooled  
cross-section 
Pooled  
cross-section 
First- 
difference 
First- 
difference 
 2011 ± 14 2013 ± 14 2011 ± 14 2013 ± 14 
          
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.050 -0.045 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.059) (0.106) 
C-section rate (%)   -0.028*** -0.033** 
   (0.011) (0.015) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.010*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Beds (public and private, per 1000 residents) -0.040 0.148 -0.586 -0.243 
 
(0.243) (0.222) (0.503) (0.463) 
Private beds (%) 0.171 0.138 1.471 0.030 
 
(0.254) (0.258) (1.038) (1.245) 
Constant 2.399 0.626 -0.024 0.002 
 
(1.881) (1.674) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
  
  Observations 732 366 732 366 
R-squared 0.590 0.637 0.037 0.062 
The dependent variable is waiting time and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all specifications 
we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument set in pooled cross-section models 
includes proportion of over 60 years old in the population, in first-difference specifications it also includes low hospital quality measured by C-section rate. 
Robust and clustered standard errors computed. 
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Table A3. Robustness check: Demand estimates without fraction oh heavy smokers among Demand controls. 
  
Pooled cross-section 
Estimation period:  
2011 ± 14 
Pooled cross-section 
Estimation period:  
2011 ± 14 
  
First-difference 
Estimation period: 
2013 ± 14 
  Variables OLS IV OLS IV 
 
OLS IV 
                
Waiting time (log) -0.077 -0.101 -0.028 -0.07 
 
-0.040* -0.243* 
 
(0.059) (0.085) (0.067) (0.103) 
 
(0.023) (0.146) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 
-0.002** -0.004** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
C-section rates (%) -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 
-0.006 -0.012 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.006) (0.008) 
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.051 0.054 0.021 0.026 
 
0.005 -0.008 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) 
 
(0.044) (0.049) 
Private beds (per 1000 residents) 0.047 0.049 0.050 0.053 
 
0.054 0.051 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
(0.056) (0.061) 
Mortality rate (per 1000  -0.024 -0.027 0.022 0.017 
 
-0.010 -0.028 
residents, at ݐ െ  ?) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.075) 
 
(0.019) (0.025) 
Constant 4.776*** 4.807*** 4.926*** 4.980*** 
 
-0.010 -0.006 
 
(0.516) (0.510) (0.587) (0.571) 
 
(0.012) (0.014) 
        Observations 732 732 366 366 
 
366 366 
R-squared 0.898 
 
0.897 
  
0.024 
 First stage F-stat   196.6   109.9     10.62 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-sectional 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument used in pooled cross-
section models is the 1-year-lagged waiting time; in the first difference specification it includes 2-years-lagged values of first differences. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered. 
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Table A4. Robustness check: Supply estimates including wages per capita.  
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference First-difference 
 
Estimation period:  
2011 ± 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 ± 14 
 Estimation period:  
2011 ± 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 ± 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
 
  
   
    
Waiting time (log) -0.016 1.126** 0.063 0.739***  0.022 0.596* -0.038* 0.160 
 
(0.056) (0.443) (0.057) (0.269)  (0.045) (0.356) (0.022) (0.193) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.011*** -0.000 -0.018*** -0.016**  0.001 0.003 -0.002** -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Beds (public and private, per 1000 residents) 1.778*** 1.238** 1.503*** 1.092**  -0.061 0.324 -0.107 -0.005 
 
(0.333) (0.489) (0.370) (0.430)  (0.235) (0.398) (0.194) (0.235) 
Private beds  (%) -0.465** -0.174 -0.165 0.110  0.416 -0.195 0.558 0.636 
 
(0.233) (0.394) (0.207) (0.300)  (0.711) (1.181) (0.491) (0.543) 
Wages (log) -0.064*** 0.019 -0.037 0.010  0.706** 0.361 0.356 0.115 
 
(0.022) (0.048) (0.026) (0.035)  (0.328) (0.517) (0.316) (0.418) 
Constant -8.290*** -8.105** -6.400** -5.599*  0.005 0.002 -0.012 -0.011 
 
(2.617) (3.491) (2.887) (3.115)  (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
   
  
 
    Observations 732 732 366 366  732 732 366 366 
R-squared 0.890 
 
0.897   0.005 -0.492 0.024 -0.189 
First stage F-stat   9.310   14.31    4.106   2.904 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-section 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument set in pooled cross-section 
models includes proportion of population over 60 years old; in the first-difference specifications it also includes C-section rates. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered. 
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Appendix 2. Data sources.  
We download from Italian Ministry of Health website Annual report on Hospital Discharges 
for years 2010-2014. Data are free and the Ministry of Health does not require any special 
permission for access. Data are available in xls format. 
For year 2014 the relevant file is: 
 ³&BBSXEEOLFD]LRQLBBXOWHULRULDOOHJDWLBXOWHULRUHDOOHJDWRBBDOOHJ´ DQG data on waiting 
times are in tables 3.10 ± 3.10(5). We use the total QXPEHU RI GLVFKDUJHV ³7RWDOH
GLPLVLVRQL´DQGWKHUHODWLYHDYHUDJHRIZDLWHGWLPHLQGD\V ³$WWHVDPHGLDLQJLRUQL´ 
For year 2013 the relevant file is: 
 ³&BBWDYROHBBDOOHJDWLBLLWHP$OOHJDWLBBILOH$OOHJDWLBLWHP)LOHBBILOH´ DQG data on 
waiting times are in tables 3.10 ± 3.10(5). We use the total QXPEHURIGLVFKDUJHV ³7RWDOH
GLPLVLVRQL´DQGWKe relative average of waited time (in days, ³$WWHVDPHGLDLQJLRUQL´ 
For year 2012 the relevant file is: 
 ³&BBWDYROHBBDOOHJDWLBLLWHP$OOHJDWLBBILOH$OOHJDWLBLWHP)LOHBBILOH´ DQG data on 
waiting times are in tables 3.10 ± 3.10(5). We use the total numbHURIGLVFKDUJHV ³7RWDOH
GLPLVLVRQL´DQGWKHUHODWLYHDYHUDJHRIZDLWHGWLPHLQGD\V ³$WWHVDPHGLDLQJLRUQL´ 
For year 2011 the relevant file is: 
 ³&BBWDYROHBBDOOHJDWLBLLWHP$OOHJDWLBBILOH$OOHJDWLBLWHP)LOHBBILOH´ DQG data on 
waiting times are in tables 3.10 ± 3.10(5). We use the total QXPEHURIGLVFKDUJHV ³7RWDOH
GLPLVLVRQL´DQGWKHUHODWLYHDYHUDJHRIZDLWHGWLPHLQGD\V ³$WWHVDPHGLDLQJLRUQL´ 
For year 2010 the relevant file is: 
 ³&BBSXEEOLFD]LRQLBBXOWHULRULDOOHJDWLBXOWHULRUHDOOHJDWRBBDOOHJ´ DQG data on waiting 
times are in tables 3.10 ± 3.10(5). We use the total QXPEHU RI GLVFKDUJHV ³7RWDOH
GLPLVLVRQL´DQGWKHUHODWLYHDYHUDJHRIZDLWHGWLPHLQGD\V ³$WWHVDPHGLDLQJLRUQL´ 
 
 
